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The Impact of the Court on ITA Policies and 
Procedures-Too Much or Too Little? 
by Donald B. Cameron* 
Teresa M. Polino** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (TAA) 1 provided for a number of 
changes in the administration of our antidumping and countervailing duty laws. 
One significant change was the expansion of the provisions for judicial review 
of the International Trade Administration's (ITA) decisions. These provisions 
expanded upon and clarified such questions as which parties were entitled to 
judicial review of decisions relating to countervailing and antidumping deter-
minations, which decisions could be so challenged, what type of review would 
be provided, and which entries would be affected by a judicial determination. 
In general, access was limited to parties with a direct commercial interest as 
opposed to broad-spectrum organizations;2 only a few limited decisions prior 
to a proceeding's final determination could be challenged;3 the judicial review 
provided for would be a review on the agency record rather than de novo as 
had previously been the rule;4 and only entries made after the court's deter-
mination would be covered by such determination unl~ss the entry's liquidation 
had been enjoined by the court.5 
This paper addresses those judicial review issues relating to the requirement 
of exhaustion of administrative remedies as applied by the Court of Interna-
tional Trade (CIT) in recent cases, and the question of when a decision by the 
Court of International Trade on an issue raised under 19 U.S.C. § 1516a is, or 
should be, considered final. The larger issue lurking behind these is whether 
• Mudge Rose Guthrie Alexander & Ferdon . 
•• Mudge Rose Guthrie Alexander & Ferdon. 
119 U.S.C.A. § 1516a (West Supp. 1980). Title X of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 amended 
Title V of the Tariff Act of 1930 by the insertion of a new section, § 516A "Judicial Review in 
Countervailing and Antidumping Duty Proceedings." Pub. L. No. 96-39. See also H.R. Rep. No. 317, 
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 179-83 (1979). 
219 U.S.C.A. § 1516a(d) (West Supp. 1980). 
, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1516a(a) (West Supp. 1980). 
419 U.S.C.A. § 1516a(b) (West Supp. 1980). 
519 U.S.C.A. §§ 1516a(c), (e) (West Supp. 1980). 
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judicial review has been "overdone" and what, if any, changes should be adopted 
in these areas to improve the system. 
II. EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES 
In a recent decision, Judge Skelley Wright of the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia listed four primary purposes served by the general rule 
requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies: 
First, it carries out the congressional purpose in granting authority 
to the agency by discouraging the frequent and deliberate flaunting 
of administrative processes [ that] could encourag[ e] people to ignore 
its procedures. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 195, 89 S.Ct. 
1657,1663 (1969). Second, it protects agency autonomy by allowing 
the agency the opportunity in the first instance to apply its expertise, 
exercise whatever discretion it may have been granted, and correct 
its own errors. Third, it aids judicial review by allowing the parties 
and the agency to develop the facts of the case in the administrative 
proceeding. Fourth, it promotes judicial economy by avoiding need-
less repetition of administrative and judicial factfinding, and by 
perhaps avoiding the necessity of any judicial involvement at all if 
the parties successfully vindicate their claims before the agency.6 
The judicial branch, to serve these purposes, devised the exhaustion rule 
which requires that all possible administrative remedies be pursued first before 
a case be brought to court.' At the same time, it is recognized that there are 
times when the application of the rule is inappropriate. Thus, "courts tailor the 
exhaustion requirement to individual situations because of the valid argument 
that exhaustion can sometimes be as damaging as premature legal involve-
ment."8 
Congress codified this judicial requirement for the exhaustion of remedies in 
cases arising under the antidumping and countervailing duty law in subsection 
(d) of § 2637 of Title 28 of the United States Code which provides that "the 
Court of International Trade shall, where appropriate, require the exhaustion of 
administrative remedies."9 Clearly, Congress also realized that the purposes of 
the exhaustion doctrine would not always be served best if the rule was applied 
blindly in every case. The court must use its discretion as to when the application 
6 Andrade v. Lauer, 729 F.2d 1475, 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
7 See also K.C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 182 at 615 (1941). 
8 C.H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 10.22 at 178 (1985) [hereinafter KOCH]' 
928 U.S.C.A. § 2637(d)(West Supp. 1982) (emphasis added). 
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of the requirement was appropriate and would further, rather than frustrate, 
the ends of both justice and judicial expediency.lO 
The failure to exhaust administrative remedies can have one of two effects, 
depending on the type of agency action involved. Either the court will tell the 
litigants to go back to the agency for a determination or the litigant will lose 
the use of the defense. II In cases filed under 19 U.S.C. 1516a, the latter result 
occurs-the party loses the ability to make the claim or defense. Because of this 
somewhat drastic result, it is imperative that the factors be weighed carefully in 
determining whether the exhaustion requirement is indeed appropriate in a 
particular case. If one is to err in such a balancing act, it should be on the side 
of the party who may lose the right to bring up a certain issue if exhaustion is 
required-no matter how meritorious the issue might have been. 
A. The Court Has Applied the Exhaustion Doctrine in a Manner Consistent with the 
Statute 
A review of some example cases illustrates that the court has correctly and 
judiciously applied the statutory provision in § 2637(d) to require the exhaustion 
of remedies where appropriate. In practice, the court has applied a "rule of 
reason."12 On the one hand, the court has stated that it will not rescue parties 
who have "slept on their rights" in the proceeding below. 13 On the other hand, 
the court has recognized that strict application of the rule is inappropriate in 
cases where parties have not had an opportunity to raise the issue before the 
agency. 14 
10 The Court of International Trade is fully cognizant of this grant of discretion. For example, in 
its opinion in Rhone Poulenc, S.A. v. United States, the court distinguished certain cases where the filing 
of protests was a statutory requirement for review: "[I]n both cases, statutes expressly barred judicial 
review of legal claims not raised administratively. In contrast, this court need only require exhaustion of 
administrative remedies 'where appropriate' as long as the statutory requirement of participation in the 
administrative proceeding is met. 28 U.s.C. § 2637(d) (1982)." 583 F. Supp. 607 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984) 
(emphasis added). 
11 KOCH, supra note 8, § 10.22 at 177. 
12 This "rule of reason" is perhaps best illustrated by the court's discussion in Al Tech Speciality 
Steel Corp., v. United States, No. 87-59, slip op. at 8-9 (Ct. Int'I Trade May 22,1987) of its application 
of the exhaustion doctrine: 
Id. 
Congress did not intend § 2637(d) to be jurisdictional in nature .... While the notions of the 
integrity of the administrative process, as embodied in the statute, suggest that exhaustion 
should be the "general rule," the courts must resist inflexible applications of the doctrine-
characteristic of jurisdictional rules--which frustrate the ability to apply exceptions developed 
to cover "exceptional cases or particular circumstances . .. where injustice might otherwise 
result" if it were applied strictly. 
13 Kokusai Electric Co. v. United States, 632 F. Supp. 23, 27 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986). 
14 See Philipp Brothers, Inc. v. United States, 630 F. Supp. 1317 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986). 
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The general rule requIrIng exhaustion of administrative remedies is best 
illustrated by the case of Kokusai Electric Co. v. United States,I5 in which the 
plaintiff challenged the scope of the Department's final antidumping determi-
nation and the resulting antidumping duty order. Plaintiff argued to the court 
that the antidumping order against cell site transceivers should not include 
"related subassemblies."16 Unfortunately, plaintiff never raised this issue to the 
Department and first raised it before the International Trade Commission (ITC) 
after the Department had issued a final determination treating cell site trans-
ceivers and subassemblies as part of the same class or kind of merchandise. 17 
The court determined that the plaintiff clearly had notice of the action the 
Department intended to take throughout the investigation and failed to raise 
the issue in the administrative proceeding before the Department. ls The court 
noted that "the reviewing court has power to exercise discretion in light of the 
circumstances and the court's idea as to what justice requires."19 Under the facts 
of this case, the court found that exhaustion was clearly appropriate. The court 
held that "in the absence of extraordinary circumstances excusing the neglect 
to raise before Commerce the issue of whether or not the related subassemblies 
were within the scope of the investigation, the court will not permit the plaintiff 
to raise the issue after Commerce closed its investigation."20 Accordingly, under 
the circumstances of this case, plaintiff's failure to raise the issue before the 
Department was fatal to its attempt to raise the issue before the court. 
The case of Philipp Brothers21 involved an appeal of a final determination in a 
§ 751 annual review of a countervailing duty order. Plaintiff challenged as 
unlawful the imposition of a weighted-average countervailing duty against im-
ports of pig iron from Brazil rather than the imposition of company-specific 
countervailing duties that had been used in the underlying countervailing duty 
order.22 The government argued, as a jurisdictional defense, that plaintiff had 
neither requested a hearing nor offered written comments on the changes it 
was now contesting in court when the use of company-specific rates had been 
proposed in the preliminary determinations.23 
On its face, the case appears to be another good candidate for the use of the 
exhaustion rule. But plaintiff contended that it should be excused from the 
exhaustion requirement for two reasons. First, within days of the publication 
15 Kokusai, supra note 13. 
16 [d. at 25-26. 
17 [d. at 26-27. 
18 [d. at 27. 
19/d. at 28, citing 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 26.7 at 444 (2d ed. 1983). 
20 [d. at 28. 
21 630 F. Supp. 1317 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986). 
"[d. at 1319, 1321-22. Apparently, the use of a weighted-average rate increased the countervailing 
duty over what it would have been had company-specific rates been applied to plaintiff's Brazilian 
supplier. 
23/d. at 1319. 
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of the preliminary determination by the Department, the Court of International 
Trade had issued its determination in Ambassador Division of Florsheim Shoe v. 
United States,24 which prohibited the Department of Commerce from retroac-· 
tively assessing increased countervailing duties. Accordingly, plaintiff assumed 
that the Department would follow the court's decision, in which case the De-
partment would be barred from implementing the weighted-average rate be-
cause it would, de facto, result in retroactively increased countervailing duties. 
The Department did not inform plaintiff or the public until its final determi-
nation that it was appealing the lower court's decision in Florsheim and would 
not follow the decision until the appeal was completed.25 Plaintiff's second 
argument was that it did not receive notification of the preliminary determi-
nation until after the expiration of the time in which to request access to the 
confidential information necessary to present its arguments that this new meth-
odology would in fact result in increased countervailing duties.26 
Weighing these two reasons together, the court held that it was "inappropriate 
to require plaintiff, under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative reme-
dies, to argue to ITA for adherence to clearly applicable precedent, to anticipate 
disregard of the precedent, and to then raise alternative arguments to the 
agency, the basis for which plaintiff could not know."27 In doing so, the court 
specifically noted that neither factor necessarily "tips the scale" requiring ex-
haustion. Indeed, the court indicated that under other circumstances the plain-
tiff might not have been relieved of its obligation to seek additional time to 
obtain access to the confidential administrative record which it needed to make 
its argument. "[A]bsent the situation created by ITA's disregard of the lower 
court opinion in Florsheim, which plaintiff had no reason to anticipate, plaintiff 
would not be relieved of its obligation to seek additional time to obtain access 
to the confidential administrative record, which it needed to make presentation 
of alternative arguments possible."28 
A second "exhaustion" issue that arose in Philipp Brothers is important because 
of the regularity with which it arises in cases before the Department. Plaintiff 
challenged a change in methodology that the Department made for the first 
time in its final determination.29 Plaintiff could not raise the issue during the 
administrative procedure because plaintiff had no knowledge that the issue 
existed until the Department's final determination was published. At that point 
it was obviously too late to raise the issue at the Department. Nonetheless, the 
government asserted that plaintiff was barred from raising the issue before the 
.4577 F. Supp. 1016 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983), rev'd, 748 F.2d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1984) . 
• 5 630 F. Supp. at 1321. 
26 [d . 
., [d . 
•• 630 F. Supp. at 1321. 
29 [d. at 1319, 1324. The issue raised here involved the Department's treatment of the lag time in 
collection of an export credit offset tax. 
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court because it had failed to raise the issue at the administrative levepo The 
court correctly pointed out that "there was no opportunity to raise the issue at 
the administrative level" and found the requirement of exhaustion of remedies 
inappropriate under the circumstances.3' 
The third major precedent in the area is Timken Co. v. United States32 This 
case is a precedent for the exception to the exhaustion rule dealing with inter-
vening judicial interpretations of existing law. In this case, plaintiff challenged 
the Department's final determination to revoke an antidumping order against 
tapered roller bearings from Japan based upon a finding that the dumping 
margins were de minimis. 33 In its review, the Commerce Department had ana-
lyzed prices during the period April 1, 1978 through November 14, 1979, which 
had been the date of a tentative notice to revoke published previously by the 
Treasury Department.34 The Commerce Department's notice of its preliminary 
results and its tentative determination to revoke were published on February 
17, 198)35 and the final revocation was published on June 15, 1982.36 The 
Commerce Department did not update the Japanese information through the 
Commerce Department's tentative determination to revoke, nor did plaintiff 
request that the Department do so at any time prior to the publication of the 
final revocation.37 
While on appeal to this court, the decision in the case of Freeport Minerals Co. 
v. United States,38 was issued by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. In 
Freeport Minerals the CAFC held that before the Department could revoke an 
order, it had to update and review the information on which it was basing the 
revocation up to the time just prior to the Department's preliminary determi-
nation.39 In Timken the preliminary determination had been issued sixteen 
months after the end of the period covered by the review. Therefore, plaintiff 
claimed a remand was necessary to collect the additional information in accor-
dance with the ruling in Freeport Minerals. 40 
30 [d. at 1324. 
" [d. 
32 630 F. Supp. 1327 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986). 
33 [d. at 1331. 
34 [d. at 1333. The original notice had been published by the Department of the Treasury because 
prior to the Reorganization Plan No.3 of 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 69 (1979) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C.A. 
§ 2171), Treasury rather than the Department of Commerce had responsibility for administering the 
countervailing duty and antidumping duty laws. 
35 Tapered Roller Bearings and Certain Components thereof from Japan (prelim. admin review) 46 
Fed. Reg. 14,371 (1981). 
36 Tapered Roller Bearings and Certain Components thereof from Japan (final admin. review) 47 
Fed. Reg. 25,757 (1982). 
" Plaintiff first raised the issue in a brief su pplementing its motions for summary judgment. 630 F. 
Supp. at 1331, 1333. 
38 590 F. Supp. 1246 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), rev'd, 776 F.2d 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
39 776 F.2d at 1033-34. 
40 630 F. Supp. at 1335. 
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The court granted plaintiff's motion citing Harmel v. Helverin£tl for the prop-
osition that one exception to the rule is those cases "in which there have been 
judicial interpretations of existing law after decision below and pending ap-
peal-interpretations which if applied might have materially altered the re-
sult."42 In explaining its decision in Freeport Minerals, the appeals court also 
noted that certain policies underlying the exhaustion doctrine were not present 
in this case: (1) the issue was one of law, not fact, and therefore the court did 
not usurp the agency's factfinding function by ruling on the issue; and (2) since 
the issue was one of law and the court decision on which plaintiff now relied 
occurred after the administrative proceedings, plaintiff could not be said to 
have intentionally refrained from raising the issue below.43 
Timken seems to be a more difficult decision than the other exhaustion cases 
and yet one that is clearly in line with the Supreme Court's holding in Harmel. 
It is a closer call, however, because both before and after the intervening 
determination in Freeport Minerals, plaintiff had been free to raise the same 
issue that the plaintiff in Freeport Minerals had raised. In Timken plaintiff simply 
had not raised the issue. Nonetheless, it is clear that the spirit that motivated 
the Court in the Harmel decision was alive in this case: 
Rules of practice and procedure are devised to promote the ends 
of Justice, not to defeat them. A rigid and undeviating judicially 
declared practice under which courts of review would invariably 
and under all circumstances decline to consider all questions which 
had not previously been specifically urged would be out of harmony 
with this policy. Orderly rules of procedure do not require sacrifice 
of the rules of fundamental justice.44 
In Timken, as in Harmel, an intervening judicial interpretation, if applied, 
would have been legally determinative. The fact that the precedent did not exist 
at the time of the underlying agency determination should not, in and of itself, 
have prevented the results of that precedent from being applied. As a result, 
the court found the application of the doctrine of exhaustion to be inappro-
priate.45 All things considered, it is not an unreasonable exception.46 
41 312 U.S. 552 (1941). 
42 312 U.S. at 558-59. 
4' 630 F. Supp. at 1334. 
44 312 U.S. at 557. 
45 Indeed, since at the time of the administrative proceeding both the agency position and the lower 
court's position was not to require up-to-date data, Plaintiff's failure to raise the issue until the appeals 
court reversed those prior determinations might also have been excused due to the perceived futility 
of doing so. 
46 A second and more bizarre exhaustion issue was raised concerning an issue raised for the first 
time on remand before the agency. The factual issue involved the question of what constituted similar 
merchandise in the fair value comparisons. Plaintiff did not raise the issue in the initial proceeding. 
Plaintiff did not raise the issue on appeal when it consented to a remand to the Department for certain 
limited purposes. It then raised this new issue at the remand stage and appealed the Department's 
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The rule of reason that appears to emerge from these cases is a good one: 
Did the parties have a reasonable and realistic opportunity to raise an issue 
and, if so, did they raise it in a timely fashion? It is one thing for the parties to 
be on notice of an issue throughout the administrative proceedings (especially 
a factual issue), fail to raise it, and then ask the court to examine the issue. This 
was precisely the situation faced by the courts in Kokusai. It is quite another 
thing for the Department to raise and decide an issue literally days before its 
final determination without input from any of the parties in the case, or for 
relevant case law to change radically after the administrative proceeding being 
appealed. The court has recognized this distinction, and has not been sympa-
thetic to the government's argument that the parties did not exhaust their 
administrative remedies. Insofar as changes in case law or interpretation are 
concerned, the court has correctly recognized that these circumstances were 
beyond the control of the parties to the administrative action, and therefore 
should be an exception to the exhaustion requirement. For those instances, 
however, when the parties fail to address a certain issue during the proceedings 
because of the Department's failure to apprise the parties that the issue exists, 
a simple administrative solution exists. The solution is not that the court strictly 
apply an exhaustion requirement, but rather that the Department devise new 
rules so that all parties to the proceeding can have meaningful input. This 
would avoid last minute determinations in which neither party has an oppor-
tunity for comment. Until this occurs, however, the court's rule of reason 
remains the only adequate solution. 
B. The Standing Requirement As It Relates to the Exhaustion Requirement 
There appears to be a strong tendency at the Department of Commerce to 
confuse the requirement of standing with the requirement to exhaust admin-
istrative remedies. Standing has to do with who-or what party-has a sufficient 
interest to be permitted to contest the determination. It is a jurisdictional 
requirement quite apart from any exhaustion requirement.47 
Nonetheless, the Department has proposed changing its definition of "party 
to the proceeding" as contained in its regulations in a manner which would 
limit the parties who can contest issues to only those parties who raised those 
failure to address the issue. The precedential value of this portion of the case appears to be nil, 
however, because of the peculiar facts of that case as well as the fact that the Department itself joined 
in the request for a second remand and agree that the doctrine of exhaustion should not apply. 
47 28 U.S.C.A. § 2631(c) (West Supp. 1982). "A civil action contesting a determination listed in 
section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930 may be commenced in the Court of International Trade by 
any interested party who was a party to the proceeding in connection with which the matter arose." 
[d. 
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very issues below.48 Such change would not further the purposes of either 
standing or exhaustion. To meet the standing requirement a party must be an 
interested party who was a party to the proceeding. Under the current regu-
lations, this means that the party must have filed the requisite notice of intent 
with the Secretary of Commerce or demonstrated good cause to the Secretary 
for intervention.49 If such a party later wants to contest some aspect of the 
determination, it should not have the additional burden of being the same 
party-or even one of the same parties-who raised or commented on that 
particular issue before the agency. It should be sufficient that some party raised 
the issue so that the agency could deal with it. Neither the standing requirement 
nor the exhaustion doctrine require, nor are their purposes served by a require-
ment, that the same party must raise an issue at both the administrative and 
judicial levels. A party who is a "party to the proceeding" may decline to raise 
a certain issue at the agency level, and then later be the party to raise it judicially 
for any number of reasons. Such circumstances should have no bearing on 
whether the party has standing and/or whether remedies have been exhausted.50 
Last year's decision by the Court of International Trade in Kokusai Electric 
Co. v. United States5l involved the questions of whether the party moving to 
participate as an intervenor was an "interested party" and whether it had been 
a "party to the proceedings." One argument advanced by the Department was 
that at the time the proposed intervenor notified the Department of its intent 
to become an interested party, it was not the "importer of record" and, there-
fore, did not qualify as an interested party.52 In this case, the court was able to 
avoid ruling on the government's position that an "importer," for purposes of 
being an interested party, meant only the "importer of record" since it found 
the intervenor to have been the importer of record during at least part of the 
48 Note the Department of Commerce's proposed amendments to its regulations on countervailing 
duty determinations wherein the Department proposes to define "Party to the Proceeding" as "any 
interested party, within the meaning of paragraph (i), which has actively participated, through written 
submissions of factual information or written argument, in a particular decision by the Secretary subject 
to judicial review." 50 Fed. Reg. 24,207 (J 985) (emphasis added). Similar language is provided for in 
the proposed amendments to the antidumping regulations as well. 51 Fed. Reg. 29,046 (1986). 
49 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.12(i), 355.9(i). 
50 Another example of the confusion that exists concerning these concepts is the case of Miller and 
Co. v. United States, 598 F. Supp. 1126 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 824 F.2d 961 
(CAFC 1987). In that case, an importer was attempting to challenge the liquidation of plaintiff's entries 
of pig iron from Brazil in accordance with a § 751 final administrative review of a countervailing duty 
order by the Department. The importer had not been a party to the administrative proceeding and 
so challenged the ultra vires actions of the Department under the residual jurisdiction of § 1581(i). 
While the language of the determination talks in terms of the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies, the 
case really appears to involve the issue of standing, i.e., whether or not plaintiff had been a "party to 
the proceeding." 
51 613 F. Supp. 1249. 
52 /d. at 1251. 
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proceedings. 53 For future cases which must decide the issue of what an "im-
porter" means, it should be recognized that the importer of record is often a 
customs broker who is merely acting as an agent. It does not make sense to 
limit the meaning of importer in a way which excludes the true "interested 
party" and allows only an agent to have standing. The court should recognize 
this and be prepared to look behind the transaction to determine the real, 
"beneficial" importer, as the proposed intervenor in Kokusai argued it should 
do. 54 Such an interpretation would be consistent with the Court of International 
Trade's decision in Special Commodity Group v. United States, where the court 
liberally construed the meaning of a "majority" in order to interpret the standing 
provisions in the context of the legislative history. 55 
Finally, with regard to both standing and exhaustion, it is noted that one of 
the major purposes behind the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 was to broaden 
the availability of judicial review, not to curtail it.56 The goal of administrative 
and judicial efficiency-which was promoted by establishing criteria for who 
may contest decisions and by requiring the exhaustion of remedies where ap-
propriate-is certainly an important one. But clearly it was not the only, nor the 
most important, goal of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979. Correct and fair 
application of the trade laws, with judicial review to help assure such application, 
was the primary goal of the judicial review amendments of the T AA. An overly 
restrictive view of who may contest ITA determinations, and which issues the 
party may contest, will not further and indeed will frustrate this goal. 
III. FINALITY OF DECISIONS 
Over the last couple of years a number of questions concerning the finality 
of decisions and related issues regarding remands, interlocutory appeals, and 
stays pending appeal have plagued both the courts and the parties. While it is 
impossible to point to nice, neat guidelines to be derived from the cases, the 
decisions do provide some general directions in which to proceed. 
A. Appeals of Remands and Stays Pending Appeals 
One issue that arises frequently when a decision by the Court of International 
Trade is appealed is whether the ITA should have to implement that decision 
53 /d. at 1252. 
54Id. at 1251. 
55 620 F. Supp. 719, 721-22. 
56 H.R. Rep. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 ("Title X will provide increased opportunities for 
appeal of certain interlocutory and all final rulings in antidumping and countervailing duty cases") 
and 179-83 (1979). 
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by remand or otherwise while the appeal is pending. A corollary to this is 
whether the ITA should have to conduct an investigation in an instance where 
a negative ITC preliminary decision was overturned by the CIT and that 
decision is on appeal. 
The judicial review provisions of § 1516a specify the manner in which court 
decisions will be applied in only one specific area, that of liquidation. 57 The 
liquidation of entries is governed by § 1516a(c)(I), (2), and (e) which provide 
that unless liquidation is enjoined it is to proceed in accordance with the decision 
by the Department of Commerce or the ITC.58 Only entries whose liquidations 
were enjoined and entries which were actually made after the date of a final 
court decision are to be liquidated in accordance with the final court decision.59 
These provisions were reviewed and discussed by the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit (CAFC) in its decision in Melamine Chemicals, Inc. v. United States.60 
The court held that entries made after the lower court's decision reversing the 
agency's negative determination were not to be treated in accordance with that 
lower court decision when an injunction had not been obtained. Rather, the 
liquidation of the entries was to proceed in accordance with the agency's deter-
mination until the final decision was rendered by the appeals court.61 
The application of a lower court's decision, when that decision is on appeal, 
in areas other than litigation is not so clearly laid out and must be derived 
largely from the case law itself. Similarly, the procedures for appealing are not 
always clear. 
For instance, with regard to the timing of an appeal of a lower court decision, 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Cabot Corp. v. United States62 
found that a decision by the lower court remanding a case back to the Depart-
ment of Commerce is not a final decision for which an appeal can be heard. 
Accordingly, since the lower court had not certified the issue for appeal, the 
remand had to be performed. The problem with this approach is that the 
availability of timely appellate review is now entirely in the discretion of the 
CIT judge, who will decide whether or not to certify the issue for appeal. It 
was argued in Cabot that the CAFC should adopt the practical approach to 
finality developed by the Supreme Court in Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp.,63 
and followed by the CAFC (and its predecessor court, the Court of Customs 
57 "Liquidation" is defined in the Customs Regulations as being the final computation or ascertain-
ment of the duties accruing on an entry. 19 C.F.R. § 159.1. 
58 19 U.S.C.A. § 1516a(c)(l) and (2) (West Supp. 1980). 
59 19 U.S.C.A.·§ 1516a(e) (West Supp. 1980). 
60 732 F.2d 924 (Fed. Cir. 1984), rev'ing and vacating 561 F. Supp 458 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983). 
61 /d. at 934. 
62 788 F.2d 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
63 379 U.S. 148 (1964). 
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and Patent Appeals) in several cases, including Maier v. Orr.64 This approach 
would have alleviated some of the problems posed by having to rely on discre-
tionary certification. The CAFC, in rejecting this approach, distinguished Maier 
and limited the rationale in Gillespie to the unique facts in that case, thereby 
eliminating any possibility of an interlocutory appeal without certification by 
the CIT. 
Given the decision in Cabot, the issue then becomes when the CIT should 
certify such decisions for appeal. It seems that a common sense approach to 
these issues should be adopted in order to minimize many of the difficulties 
faced by the parties in a remand situation. 
Limited interlocutory appeals are provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), and 
require that the order from which an appeal is to be certified must involve a 
controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference 
of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance 
the ultimate termination of the litigation. It has been said that § 1292(b) should 
not be used in "run of the mill" cases and is intended for "exceptional cases" 
where appeal may avoid "protracted and expensive" litigation.65 Whether the 
court would have certified Cabot for interlocutory appeal is not known, but 
certainly the argument can be made that a determination on what "generally 
available" means in a countervailing duty case is a controlling question of law, 
the resolution of which would materially advance the case so as to avoid pro-
tracted and expensive litigation. 
Although requests for certification have not occurred very often, the Court 
of International Trade was requested to and did certify one of the numerous 
cases66 which arose and were pending all at about the same time involving an 
important issue of the manner in which the ITC made its preliminary deter-
minations. In those cases there was clearly a "controlling question of law" and 
the immediate appeal could "materially advance the ultimate termination of the 
litigation." Difficulties arose, however, in some of the other cases involving this 
same issue where the court refused to certify the case for appeal. 
The case of jeannette Sheet Glass Corp. v. United States67 demonstrates the 
hardship caused when such cases are not certified for appeal. In jeannette Sheet 
Glass the ITC had made a negative preliminary determination, thereby termi-
64 754 F.2d 973 (Fed. Cir. 1985). This approach would generally find a remand order to be final 
and appealable when the results of the remand are a foregone conclusion. 
65 C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 102 at 518 (3d ed. 1976). 
66 American Lamb Co. v. U.S., 611 F. Supp. 979 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985) was certified for appeal. 
Those cases which were not certified include Jeannette Sheet Glass Corp. v. United States, 607 F. Supp 
123 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985) and American Grape Growers Alliance for Fair Trade v. United States, No. 
85-104, slip op. (Ct. Int'l Trade Oct. 7, 1985). 
67 Appeal No. 85-2554 (Fed. Cir. June 2, 1986). 
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nating the proceeding prior to the Department of Commerce's fair value in-
vestigation. The Court of International Trade held that the manner in which 
the determination was made was not proper under the statute and remanded 
the case back to the ITC for a new determination.6B Based upon the court's 
instructions as to the proper standard to apply, the ITC was forced to issue an 
affirmative decision. Although the appeals court had reversed the lower court 
on the basis of its decision in American Lamb Co. v. United States69 with regard to 
the same issue of the appropriate standard for ITC preliminary decisions, it 
could not do so in Jeannette Sheet Glass since the case had not been certified. The 
Department of Commerce was then faced with the possibility of conducting an 
investigation in a case where it was clear that the ITC had used the wrong 
standard in issuing its preliminary affirmative determination. If the case had 
been forced to completion, the issue of the correctness of the preliminary 
determination (an issue which had already been decided the other way by the 
CAFC) would never have been raised at the CAFC because at that point in time, 
only the final decision would be contestable. Luckily for the respondent-defen-
dants, the CIT eventually granted their motion to reconsider, which had been 
pending for more than two years, and affirmed the ITC in light of American 
Lamb.70 
In other types of cases, such as when a remand is ordered, the question of 
whether or not certification is warranted is less clear. However, the criterion is 
the same. The effect of conducting the remand, on the litigation as well as on 
the parties, should be closely examined along with the issue of law involved. 
An additional problem related to finality is the issue of stays pending appeal. 
In most instances, a stay pending appeal will also be requested by the party 
filing the appeal. However, it is clear that not every case in which a remand 
decision is appealed should be stayed. As the court correctly noted in Badger-
Powhatan, Inc. v. United States7l a stay will be issued only where the interests of 
justice are served. The factors to be considered in making this determination 
include 1) whether petitioner is likely to prevail on the merits of his appeal; 2) 
whether, without a stay, the petitioner will suffer irreparable harm; 3) whether 
the issuance of a stay will substantially harm other parties interested in the 
proceeding; and 4) where the public interest lies.72 The Badger-Powhatan court 
correctly found that the imposition of increased duty deposits, which if ulti-
68 607 F. Supp 123 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985). 
69 785 F.2d 994 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
70 Jeannette Sheet Glass Corp. v. United States, No. 87-4, slip op. (Ct. Int'l Trade Jan. 9, 1987). 
71 638 F. Supp. 344. (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986). 
72 [d. at 349. 
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mately decided to be incorrect would be refunded with interest, did not warrant 
the issuing of a stay.73 
The denial of a stay pending an appeal in American Grape Growers Alliance for 
Fair Trade v. United States7' is more difficult to accept. In examining the four 
factors, the Court of International Trade was probably correct in putting little 
weight on the first criterion as the case was one of first impression before the 
court. After all, as the court noted, if the judge believed petitioner was likely to 
succeed on appeal it is unlikely the judge would have ruled as he did in the 
first place.75 Normally, the issue is more adequately addressed in terms of how 
the public interest will best be served and which party will suffer the greater 
injury. 
The irony in cases such as American Grape Growers is that a primary question 
is whether the petitioner will be irreparably harmed without a stay. In this type 
of case, the injury incurred by the plaintiff-petitioner is that he does not receive 
relief for the injury he claims that he is suffering while awaiting the appeal. He 
is, however, appealing a decision in which the ITC found he had not shown a 
reasonable indication of injury. While it is true that the Court of International 
Trade overturned that determination by the Commission, it was not because 
the court found the Commission's factual determination was incorrect, but 
because the court believed the Commission had applied too high a standard 
and had looked beyond the four corners of the petition.76 
Under such circumstances, where, as the court pointed out, the investigations 
are complicated and time-consuming, how is the public interest best served?77 
It is difficult to see how the public interest is served by continuing such inves-
tigations at the administrative level when there is any sort of realistic chance 
for reversal of the lower court's decision. There is a very real economic cost, 
resulting from the conduct of these investigations, which society bears no matter 
what the outcome of the case. No one really gains from the investigation itself 
(except in the sense that such investigations harass respondents, thereby bene-
fitting petitioners). Therefore, it seems clear that the public does not benefit 
from pursuit of a complicated and time-consuming investigation when it can 
be determined very early on that the investigation is not warranted. The avoid-
73 Id. at 34~-50. It is noted that the stay requested in Badger-Powhatan was pending the appeal from 
a remand decision, not an order for a remand. However, the analysis as to whether a stay should be 
granted or not is the same for either. 
74 No. 85-104, slip op. (Ct. Int'l Trade Oct. 7, 1985). 
75 This is not always the case, however, as where a judge feels bound to follow his brethren on the 
same court in a particular issue, but may actually believe the decision likely to be reversed on appeal. 
76 No. 85-104, slip. op. at 2-3. The court held that "the investigation had been terminated unlawfully 
due to the application of the excessively stringent standard for determining whether there was a 
reasonable indication of injury at the preliminary stage." 
77 Id. at p. 8. 
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ance of such an unwarranted procedure was one reason for the origination of 
the thirty-day preliminary injury investigation in the 1974 Trade Act.78 
As alluded to above, it might be that the domestic party benefits from the 
continuation of an investigation if it is not stayed pending appeal. Such benefit 
must be weighed against the injury caused to both the respondents and the 
agency itself. The costs accruing to these parties for conducting an investigation 
that may ultimately prove to have been totally unnecessary, are tangible, mea-
surable, and extremely high. The cost or injury to the party who has filed the 
case, whether or not the case is meritorious, is by its very nature much more 
nebulous and speculative. Indeed in these particular types of cases the Com-
mission has already found that there is no reasonable indication of i~ury. In 
view of the fact that such appeals are usually decided within a relatively short 
time, it is impossible to see how, in any but the most extreme cases, the weighing 
of injury to each of the concerned parties will favor the denial of a stay. 79 
B. Standing to Appeal or Intervene in a Remand 
Another important issue relating to the requirement of standing that the 
court has faced on a number of occasions is whether parties should be able to 
sue the Department over a remand when they did not sue on the original 
determination. Related to this is the issue of whether a party should be allowed 
to intervene concerning the results of a remand.80 An analysis of the CIT's 
decisions in this area indicates that they are viewing these issues similarly to the 
way the court decides issues involving the exhaustion requirement. The court 
looks closely at whether or not the party had the opportunity and the reason 
to sue on or intervene in the original decision. Where the original decision did 
not provide a reason upon which a party normally would sue, i.e. the decision 
was favorable to the party even though the party may have disagreed with 
certain findings of the decision, the party will not be found to have waived its 
rights when, upon remand, the agency changes the decision and it then becomes 
unfavorable to the party for the first time. For example, in Freeport Minerals Co. 
v. United States,81 the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the 
lower court had erred in finding that Freeport's action was untimely where the 
action was filed within thirty days after a determination on remand rather than 
78 See Trade Reform Act of 1974, Report of the Committee on Finance, S. Rep. No. 1298, 93d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 32 and 171 (1974). 
79 On the other hand, the scale seems more clearly tipped to denying a stay as the CIT did in Philipp 
Brothers, Inc. v. United States, 640 F. Supp. 261 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986) where the only harm any party 
could point to in performing the remand was that of administrative inconvenience to the agency. 
80 Intervention is permitted by rule of the Rules of the Court of International Trade and 28 U .S.C.A. 
§ 26310> (West Supp. 1982). 
81 758 F.2d 629 (Fed. Cir. 1985), reversing 583 F. Supp. 586 (Ct. Int'I Trade 1984). 
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thirty days after the original determination. The original determination had 
found no less-than-fair-market-value sales by the respondent in the case, but 
had determined not to revoke the outstanding order. Freeport, the petitioner, 
was satisfied that the order was not to be revoked, and argued that 
it would have made no sense and would have wasted judicial and 
legal resources for it to have sought review upon publication of the 
1982 notice postponing revocation for the purpose of challenging 
the finding that Chevron had not been selling elemental sulphur at 
less than fair value, because the end result of review at that time 
was favorable to Freeport. As a domestic producer, Freeport's con-
cern was and remains continuation of the antidumping order against 
Chevron and the Canadian companies. It wasn't until lTC's 1983 
notice revoking the order regarding those companies that Freeport 
believed it was aggrieved.82 
The appeals court stated that its statutory analysis led it to believe the ITA 
notice to revoke the order which was published pursuant to a remand deter-
mination was a reviewable decision under § lS16a(a)(2)(B)(iii) so that an appeal 
filed within thirty days of that notice was timely.83 It is clear from the case that 
where a particular party to a proceeding is not harmed by the initial adminis-
trative decision, that party cannot be held to have waived its right to appeal an 
adverse administrative decision when, upon remand, the agency issues a decision 
which for the first time is adverse that party.84 
It is interesting to compare this decision to a case with a somewhat similar 
factual pattern, though not involving a remand, that of Canadian Meat Council 
v. United States. 85 The plaintiff in Canadian Meat Council filed an action to contest 
certain aspects of the ITA's affirmative determination of sales at less than fair 
value.86 The defendant and the defendant-intervenors moved to dismiss the 
action based on the fact that no order had been issued in the case, since the 
ITC had found no injury with regard to the plaintiff's products.87 However, 
the court refused to dismiss the action in view of the fact that the "no injury" 
determination was being challenged by the defendant-intervenors in a separate 
82 758 F.2d at 633. 
83 /d. at 634. 
84 In Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp. v. United States, 633 F. Supp. 1376 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986) a party 
to the proceeding attempted to intervene after a remand determination on issues which were newly 
raised by the remand. The court denied such intervention on the basis that the party was really raising 
new claims which were not already a part of that action and therefore required the filing of a new 
action. The court again noted that the remand determination was a determination on which an action 
could be filed under 19 U.S.C.A. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(iii)(West Supp. 1986). 
85 644 F. Supp. 1125 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986). 
86 Live Swine and Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork Products from Canada, 50 Fed. Reg. 31,931 
(Dep't Comm. 1985)(final admin. review). 
87 644 F. Supp. at 1126. 
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action. A reversal of the ITC injury determination would leave the plaintiff 
with an adverse ITA determination, which would then have an effect on the 
plaintiff, but no way to challenge that determination: by the time the ITC 
determination was reversed, a challenge to the ITA determination would no 
longer be timely. Hence, notwithstanding the fact that the "bottom-line" deter-
mination in the case had been favorable to the Canadian Meat Council, it was 
permitted to challenge the adverse aspects of the proceeding. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 continued the trend started in the Trade 
Act of 1974 toward allowing broader access to the court, while simultaneously 
limiting access to parties with a demonstrable economic interest who participated 
in the agency proceedings. Generally speaking, as clearly evidenced by the 
court's determinations in the exhaustion area, the court has applied a rule of 
reason consistent with the intent of Congress and with common sense. Many of 
the exceptions to the general rule of exhaustion are unavoidable-for instance, 
where there are intervening judicial decisions during the pendency of the 
appeal. On the other hand, dealing with the exhaustion issue arising when 
opportunity for comment is not extended by the Department is a problem that 
should be resolved by a change in Department procedures. Until that occurs, 
the court's approach to that exhaustion issue is proper. 
Similarly, the court appears for the most part to approach issues of appeal 
and remand with the same common sense. There may still be room for further 
analysis in the area of "balancing the hardships." However, issues concerning 
when one should appeal or intervene have been judiciously treated by ensuring 
that the party has a proper day in court-or at least has such an option-while 
not allowing parties to sit on their rights and then still expect to be heard. 
